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Abstract 
High-tech is a commonly used catch-word for industries that use a 
relatively large share of their resources on R&D and develop many 
new products and processes. It is a widely held view that high-
tech is good for growth, and that countries that succeed in high-
tech industry perform well. Schumpeterian theory, as well as the 
more recent “new growth” theories, are often quoted in support of 
this  view.  However,  the  “new  growth”  theories  also  suggest  that 
large  countries  are  more  likely  than  small  ones  to  succeed  in 
high-tech.  This  paper  explores  empirically  the  factors  behind 
success  or  failure  in  high-tech  industry  for  a  sample  of  OECD 
countries  from  the  1960s  to  the  1980s.  It  is  concluded  that 
although  there  exists  a  group  of  high-tech  industries  for  which 
the  scale  of  the  country  seems  to  matter  a  lot,  this  does  not 
extend to all industries where R&D and innovation are important. 
However,  cost  competition  tends  to  be  more  severe  in  those 
industries where small countries can compete on equal terms. Thus, 
small  countries  do  to  some  extent  face  a  greater  challenge  in 
high-tech than large countries  
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1. Introduction 
 
High-tech is a commonly used catch-word for industries that use a 
relatively large share of their resources on R&D and develop many 
new products and processes. Sometimes it is argued that one should 
also include industries that make intensive use of products with a 
high R&D content, even if they do not spend much on R&D or develop 
much new technology themselves. Although this broader definition 
may be interesting for some purposes, in this paper we will stick 
to the more commonly used, narrow definition. This restricts the 
concept, high-tech, to industries that innovate.   
  To explain why high-tech is important, we need to focus on 
the  links  between  innovation,  growth  and  trade.  The  classic 
reference  is  Schumpeter  (1934,  1939,  1943).  In  his  theory  of 
industrial  development,  innovation  is  assumed  to  be  the  single 
most  important  competitive  factor.  Innovative  firms  have  a 
temporary monopoly which allows them to charge higher prices and, 
hence, be more profitable than other firms. They will also grow 
faster,  partly  because  they  have  the  market  temporarily  for 
themselves,  and  partly  because  their  higher  innovative  ability 
implies that they are more competitive in the marketplace. There 
is  also  a  stimulus  from  the  demand  side,  sinde  the  growth  of 
demand for goods based on new technology generally outstrips the 
growth  of  demand  for  goods  based  on  older  technologies.  For  
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technological  as  well  as  economic  reasons,  Schumpeter  expected 
innovations  to  cluster  in  some  (R&D-intensive)  industries. 
Production  in  these  industries  should  be  expected  to  experience 
above average growth. The same goes for trade. In fact, from the 
1960s  to  the  1980s  the  share  of  high-tech  in  world  trade  (as 
defined in this study) roughly doubled. 
  Thus, high-tech means high growth, and this probably explains 
the general concern in many countries for the fate of high-tech 
industries. Indeed, it seems to be a widespread view among policy-
makers that success in high-tech industry (and exports) is a good 
recipe for high growth in national income. Recently, this view has 
got  greater  academic  credibility  to  the  advent  of  "new  growth 
theories" emphasizing the importance of innovation and organized 
R&D  for  economic  growth  (Romer  1990,  Grossman  and  Helpman  1991, 
for  an  overview  see  Verspagen  1992).  But  what  determines  the 
extent to which a country succeeds in specializing in high-tech? 
When  this  question  was  first  raised  in  the  1960s,  it  became 
apparent  that  traditional  trade  theory  (Hecksher-Ohlin)  had 
relatively  little  to  say  about  the  subject.  This  led  to  the 
formulation of so-called "neotechnological" trade theories, to a 
large  extent  inspired  by  Schumpeterian  perspectives  (for  an 
overview, see Dosi and Soete 1988). These theories and subsequent 
empirical work based on this perspective suggested a link between 
a strong competitive position in high-tech trade and domestic R&D  
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efforts: "All roads lead to a link between export performance and 
R&D"  (Gruber,  Metha  and  Vernon  1967,  p.  22).
1  The  importance  of 
R&D  and  innovation  for  trade  performance  was  also  demonstrated 
empirically  by  Lacroix  and  Scheuer  (1976).  More  recently,  Soete 
(1981,  1987)  and  Dosi  and  Soete  (1983)  have  provided  additional 
evidence  for  the  view  that  national  technological  activity, 
measured  through  R&D  or  patent-statistics,  matters  for  export 
performance in high-tech (and some not-so-high-tech) industries.  
  The  policy  implication  of  much  of  this  seems  to  be  that  a 
country  can  affect  its  chance  of  success  in  high-technology 
industries  by  devoting  resources  to  R&D.  However,  some  recent 
theoretical  works  indicate  that  it  may  not  be  so  simple.  For 
instance,  some  "new  growth  theories"  suggest  that  while  R&D-
efforts matter for high-export, so does country size (see Grossman 
and  Helpman  1991).  These  theories  emphasize  that  R&D  efforts 
generate technological spillovers that facilitate (reduce the cost 
of)  subsequent  R&D  projects  (or  innovations).  Since  a  large 
country does much more R&D than a small one, there will be more 
spillovers  and  lower  costs  of  innovative  activity  in  the  large 
country. Hence, in the long run a large country may gain the upper 
hand in high-tech even if it at the outset devotes a smaller share 
                     
    
1  Another  suggestion  was  that  innovation  was  facilitated  by 
advanced  domestic  demand  (Linder  1961,  Vernon  1966),  for  an 
empirical test of this view see Fagerberg 1995, forthcoming.  
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of  its  resources  to  organized  R&D  than  a  smaller  one.
2  This 
result,  which  obviously  rests  on  the  assumption  of  geographical 
limitations  on  technology  spillovers,  may  have  important 
implications for policy. To the best of our knowledge there is not 
much empirical work that investigates the joint impact of national 
technological activity, country size and other factors on export 
performance.  This  paper  is  a  modest  attempt  to  throw  some  more 
light on this issue.  
 
2. The design of the test 
 
The analysis that follows is based on the commonly used assumption 
that (a) a country's specialization pattern in international trade 
results  from  the  interaction  between  (b)  industry  specific 
conditions of competition and (c) country specific capabilities. 
Knowledge  about  any  two  of  these  may  then  be  used  to  make 
inferences about the third element, in this case the conditions of 
competition  at  the  industry  level.  Basically,  this  is  the 
methodology  proposed  by  Leamer  (1974).  However,  while  Leamer 
starts  from  the  traditional  factor  abundance  theory,  we  apply  a 
                     
    
2 This may be seen as a special version of the more general 
prediction  of  so  called  "new  trade  theory"  (Helpman  1984);  that 
countries  with  small  domestic  markets  may  face  a  potential 
disadvantage  in  industries  where  economies  of  scale  prevail  if 
products  are  differentiated  or  there  are  barriers  to  trade 
(protectionism etc.).   
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more  eclectic  model  that  allows  for  variables  consistent  with 
different  theoretical  approaches.  Nevertheless,  our  point  of 
departure will be the Schumpeterian inspired models discussed in 
the preceding paragraph.  
  The model to be tested is set out in equation 1 below. For 
reasons  that  will  become  apparent,  a  log-linear  form  was 
preferred:  
                   m 
log Sij  =   ao +   Σ  ai log Clj        (1) 
                   l=1 
 
where: 
Sij = Specialization index (RCA) for country j in commodity group   
i  
Clj = Set of capabilities (l) for country j 
 
  To  measure  specialization,  we  use  the  familiar  index  for 
revealed comparative advantage (Balassa, 1965). For a particular 
country and product, this index is the ratio between the market 
share  of  the  country  on  the  world  market  for  this  particular 
product and the market share of the country on the world market 
for all products. This index has the property that the weighted 
mean is identical to unity for each country across all commodity 
groups, and for each commodity group across all countries. Thus, a  
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country  is  said  to  have  a  revealed  comparative  advantage  (be 
specialized) in a product if the RCA index exceeds unity. However, 
the index has a skew distribution, with a long tail to the right. 
This creates problems in regression analysis, because it violates 
the assumption of normality. Since a logarithmic transformation of 
the  data  reduces  this  problem  significantly,  a  log-linear 
functional form was preferred (equation 1 above). 
  The calculation of the RCA index draws from a database
3 on 
OECD trade (value data
4). The data were aggregated into 41 product 
groups  (see  table  1).  Great  care  was  taken  to  ensure  that  R&D-
intensive  products  as  well  as  products  based  on  important, 
commercially  successful  innovations  in  the  not  too  distant  past 
were  specified  as  separate  products,  while  more  mature  products 
and  raw  materials  were  treated  in  a  more  aggregative  way.  The 
identification  of  the  R&D-intensive  products  was  based  on  other 
studies (Kelly 1977, Aho and Rosen 1980, OECD 1985). While the two 
                     
    
3 The database was constructed jointly by Bent Dalum (at the 
University of Aalborg) and the author from OECD Trade Series C. 
See Fagerberg (1986) for details. 
    
4  It  is  often  suggested  that  it  would  be  preferable  to  use 
volume data instead of value data, but this was not possible at a 
sufficiently  disaggregated  level.  Furthermore,  volume  data  are 
problematic in cases where substantial technological changes occur 
and become, for the very same reason, less reliable when the time 
span under consideration grows. For instance, it is very difficult 
to compare the trade volumes of, say, computers in the 1960s and 
the 1980s, since it is not clear how "volume" in this case should 
be defined.  
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earlier studies were based solely on US data, the last one uses 
data  for  a  group  of  OECD  countries.  However,  with  a  few 
exceptions, these studies end up with rather similar rankings of 
products according to R&D intensity (expenditures on research and 
development as a share of output or sales).
5  
  From  the  41  products  included  in  the  classification,  raw 
materials,  where  comparative  advantage  probably  depends  on  the 
domestic supply of natural resources, and residual categories were 
excluded  from  the  investigation.  The  remaining  28  products 
accounted  for  61.2%  of  total  OECD  exports  in  1983.  The  single 
largest group was cars, which alone accounted for 11.0% of total 
OECD exports that year, the share of the others varied from 0.2% 
to 5.7%. 
  One  of  the  problems  in  this  study,  as  in  most  econometric 
studies of export specialization, is the selection of explanatory 
variables  and  proxies.  Indeed,  the  potential  number  of  factors 
that  could  have  been  taken  into  account  is  very  large.  Here  we 
                     
    
5 It should be noted, though, that a few products classified 
as  R&D-intensive  in  the  two  earlier  studies,  did  not  appear  as 
such  in  the  last  study  (non-electronic  office  machinery 
(typewriters etc.), consumer electronics and cars). Probably this 
reflects that these products, by the early 1970s, had entered the 
mature phase of the product cycle. We have chosen to regard these 
as  R&D  intensive  prior  to  1973,  but  not  later.  Thus,  we  end  up 
with two lists of high-tech products, a broad one, applicable for 
the 1960s and early 1970s, and a more narrow one, assumed to be 
appropriate for the most recent period. 
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have  to  rely  on  theoretical  considerations  and  the  specific 
purpose  of  the  study.  The  basic  model  will  be  one  where 
comparative advantage is created through technological capability, 
measured  through  R&D  or  patent  statistics,  and  challenged  by 
imitators  exploiting  cost  advantages  (low  wages).  To  this 
framework  we  add  variables  reflecting  various  factors  that  are 
often  alleged  to  have  an  important  impact  on  export 
specialization.  One  of  these,  which  follows  from  the  purpose  of 
this study, is the country size or scale variable, here proxied by 
the size of the population. Since it is often argued that military 
demand  has  been  an  important  factor  for  the  creation  of 
competitive advantage in many high-technology industries, we also 
included military expenditures as percentage of GDP as a possible 
explanatory  factor.  Finally,  to  be  able  to  account  for  the 
possibility  of  differing  requirements  of  capital  across 
industries, we included gross investment as a share of GDP.  Since 
raw  materials  were  excluded  from  the  investigation,  we  did  not 
include  any  variable  reflecting  relative  "abundance"  of  natural 
resources.  Admittedly,  many  of  these  variables  are  of  a  rather 
crude nature and, as in most other econometric studies of export 
specialization,  the  results  should  be  taken  as  just  indicative. 
Below  follows  a  list  the  explanatory  variables  included  in  the 
test. For sources, see appendix. 
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-  Research  and  development  (RD):  Total  R&D  expenditure  as  a 
percentage of GDP. 
- Patents (PAT): External patent applications adjusted for country 
size and the openness of the economy.
6 
- Wages (WAGE): Wage per hour in common currency. 
- Scale (POP): Population of the country. 
- Military demand (MIL): Military expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP. 
- Investments (INV): Gross investments as a percentage of GDP. 
 
  As  will  often  be  the  case,  some  of  these  variables  may  be 
open for rival interpretations. For instance, the investment and 
wage variable could be interpreted as reflecting "endowments" of 
capital and labour respectively (the traditional factor-proportion 
-  or  Hecksher-Ohlin  -  theory).  By  stretching  the  argument 
somewhat, R&D expenditure could be interpreted as reflecting the 
"endowment  of  skilled  labour",  on  which  R&D  activity  obviously 
depends  (the  so  called  neo-factor  proportion  theory).  Patents, 
scale and military expenditure, however, are variables that hardly 
fit  into  a  neo-factor  proportion  framework.  In  any  case, 
                     
    
6  The  reason  for  adjusting  the  index  for  differences  in  the 
degree of openness of the economy is that the propensity to patent 
in  foreign  markets  is  assumed  to  depend  on  the  importance  of 
export  markets  relative  to  the  domestic  market  (see  Fagerberg 
1987).  
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considerable doubts may be raised about the usefulness of the neo-
factor approach. Arguably, to label something "endowment" - when 
it  clearly  reflects  conscious  human  behaviour  -  does  not 
constitute much of an explanation.  
  The  data  refers  to  different  time  periods  between  1960  and 
1983. 19 OECD member countries were included.
7 For the dependent 
variable indices were calculated for 1969, 1973, 1979, and 1983. 
The data for the independent variables were calculated as average 
values for the preceding periods (1960 to 1967, 1968-1973, 1974-
1979  and  1980-1983)  allowing  for  an  average  lag  of  roughly  3 
years.  Since  the  dependent  variable,  the  revealed  comparative 
advantage index, is a normalized variable, we decided to normalize 
all the independent variables in the same way. This implies that, 
for  each  country  (and  year),  the  value  of  each  independent 




                     
    
7  These  are:  USA,  Japan,  Germany  (west),  France,  UK,  Italy, 
Canada,  Austria,  Belgium,  Denmark,  the  Netherlands,  Norway, 
Sweden,  Switzerland,  Finland,  Ireland,  Spain,  New  Zealand  and 
Australia. 
    
8 Some countries had values for the RCA index close to zero in 
some sectors. In order to avoid extreme values in the regressions 
(a logarithmic specification was used) we restricted the lower end 
of the observations to 0.1 by adding 0.1 to all observations of 
the dependent and the independent variables. Thus, the average for 
each variable in each year is 1.1, not 1.0.  
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3. Results. 
 
Three different tests were carried out: a pooled test (all time 
periods  combined),  a  mean  test  (regression  between  the  within 
country means across years of each variable) and a difference test 
(a regression between the difference between the final observation 
and the first observation of each variable).  
  The  advantage  of  a  pooled  test  is  that  it  combines 
information on the static and dynamic aspects of the model, and 
allows for a much greater sample than could otherwise have been 
used.  The  problem  is  that  specification  problems,  in  particular 
the omission of country specific variables, may result in residual 
correlation within the cross sectional units. To test for this we 
applied  the  Durbin-Watson  test  adjusted  for  gaps.  The  test 
indicated  that  residual  correlation  within  the  cross-sectional 
units was a problem. Methods to remedy this consist of excluding, 
totally or in part, that share of the total variance that can be 
associated with the within-country means of the variables (Maddala 
1977, Johnston 1984). These methods are problematic in cases where 
the  within-country  means  are  considered  to  be  important  as 
explanatory factors, especially if some of them do not change much 
trough time, as is the case for many of the variables considered 
here. We decided, therefore, following one of the suggestions made  
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in the econometric literature,
9 to supplement the pooled test with 
separate tests for the statics and dynamics of the model.  
  The interpretation of the two additional tests is as follows. 
The mean test is a test of the long run implications of the model, 
or  to  what  extent  the  structure  of  comparative  advantage  (or 
export specialization) within each product group for the period as 
a whole can be explained by the independent variables included in 
the test. The difference test, on the other hand, tests the extent 
to  which  the  changes  in  the  structure  of  comparative  advantages 
during the period of investigation can be explained by changes in 
the variables included in the test. This opens for the possibility 
that  the  determinants  of  the  existing  pattern  of  specialization 
across countries differ from those explaining the dynamics of this 
pattern. 
  In each case a backward search for the model with the least 
variance  was  used.  The  reason  why  we  included  both  a  R&D-based 
measure and a patent-based measure in the regressions, even though 
these  are  known  to  be  heavily  correlated  across  countries 
(Fagerberg 1987, 1988), is that other studies have shown that the 
significance  of  these  two  variables  differ  across  sectors.  So, 
even  if  only  one  of  them  usually  will  be  retained,  we  found  it 
advisable to start the search with both variables included.   
  The  results  are  reported  in  tables  2-4.  Restricted  R
2  and 
                     
    
9 See Maddala (1977) p. 326 and Johnston (1984) p. 405-6.  
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variables  that  were  significant  at  a  10%  level  or  more  are 
included  (for  the  others  we  accepted  the  proposition  that  their 
impact  was  not  significantly  different  from  zero).  The  main 
results may be summarized as follows: 
 
1)  If  we  restrict  ourselves  to  products  where  one  or  more 
factors were significant at a 1% level in the pooled test, 
and at a 5% level in at least one of the two supplementary 
tests, there were twenty products that met these criteria and 
eight that did not. The latter were: paper, textiles, steel, 
aluminium, fertilizers, office machinery, domestic electrical 
equipment  and  furniture.  Together  these  eight  products 
accounted for 13.4% of total OECD exports in 1983 (or roughly 
one fifth of our sample). Of these eight products, six come 
from  industries  processing  raw  materials.  For  these  a 
possible explanation may be that success depends on "relative 
abundance" of important resources (including, perhaps, cheap 
energy) not taken into account in the test. 
2)  The  clearly  most  important  factor  according  to  the  above 
criteria was technology, which was significant in fourteen of 
the twenty cases mentioned above. But also the wage-level was 
found to be important (ten cases). The scale variable turned 
out  to  be  significant  in  six  cases  and  the  two  remaining 
factors, military demand and investments, in two cases each.  
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The explanatory power of the different factors (in terms of 
number  of  significant  estimates)  is  reflected  in  the 
different sizes of the circles in graph 1. If the products 
had  been  weighted  according  to  their  shares  in  total  OECD 
trade,  the  differences  in  explanatory  power  between  the 
technology, wage and scale variables would have been smaller, 
but  technology  would  still  had  been  the  most  important 
factor.  In  1983  the  share  in  total  OECD  exports  of  the 
products  for  which  technology  was  found  to  be  an  important 
factor  was  29.9%.  The  shares  for  products  where  wages  and 
scale were relevant were 24.3% and 20.7%, respectively.
10 The 
shares  of  products  in  which  the  two  remaining  factors, 
military demand and investments, were important were 3.0% and 
2.2%, respectively, i.e. not very large. 
3)  As Graph 1 shows, there are many cases of overlap between the 
various  factors,  especially  between  technology  on  the  one 
hand, and wages and scale on the other. But there was only 
one case of overlap between wages and scale, semiconductors, 
for which also technology was found to be important factor. 
Thus, with the exception of semiconductors, the products for 
which technology was found to be an important factor divide 
neatly  in  three:  one  group  where  technology  and  scale  (but 
                     
    
10 It should be noted, however, that the size of the share for 
the  scale  factor  depends  very  much  on  one  product  group,  cars, 
which alone accounted for 11.0 % of total OECD exports in 1983.   
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not  wages)  are  important  (two  products),  another  where 
technology  and  wages  (but  not  scale)  are  important  (eight 
products) and finally one where only technology matters (four 
products).  The  most  important  of  these,  numerically  and 
economically, is the one where technology and wages matter. 
In 1983 this group alone accounted for 21.5 % of total OECD 
trade.  
4)  If we adopt the stricter criteria of products where one or 
more factors were found to be significant at a 1% level in 
the pooled test and at a 5% in both the supplementary tests, 
the  dominant  role  played  by  technology  is  strengthened.  In 
this case technology was found to be a significant factor in 
eight  products,  compared  to  one  product  each  for  scale  and 
investments  and  no  product  for  wages  and  military  demand.  
Thus,  technology  is  the  only  factor  that  has  sufficient 
explanatory  power  to  explain  both  the  statics  and  the 
dynamics of the model. 
5)  When  the  dynamics  is  tested  separately  (table  4),  the 
important  role  played  by  technology  is  again  confirmed.  If 
the 5% level of significance is adopted, technology turns out 
as  a  significant  factor  (with  correct  sign)  in  eleven 
products, compared to two for wages and one for scale.
11 It 
                     
    
11  In  the  case  of  the  scale  variable  it  should  be  mentioned 
that  since  this  variable  is  relatively  stable  through  time,  it 
should be expected to lose much of its impact in a test of this 
type irrespective of whether the hypothesis under test is true or  
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is  interesting  to  note,  however,  that  the  investments 
variable performs much better in this test (significant at a 
5%-level in seven products) than in the other two, i.e. that 
growth  in  comparative  advantage  and  growth  in  investment 
activity are positively correlated in many cases.
12 The same 
applies,  although  not  to  the  same  extent,  to  growth  in 
comparative  advantage  and  growth  in  military  expenditure 
(four products).  
  
  If  we  compare  the  results  obtained  here  with  the  R&D-
intensity of products as reported by other sources (see table 1), 
some  important  similarities,  as  well  as  differences,  emerge. 
First,  out  of  the  thirteen  goods  that  are  classified  as  R&D 
intensive  in  table  1,  eight  are  included  in  the  group  where 
technology  was  found  to  have  a  significant  impact.  All  but  one 
belong to the group of products for which technology was found to 
affect both the statistics and dynamics of the model (see point 4 
above). The remaining five R&D-intensive products are distributed 
                                                                  
false. The same applies - although perhaps not to the same extent 
- to some of the other variables. 
    
12 It might be suggested that this result supports the factor-
abundance  theory.  However,  this  theory  would  also  predict  a 
positive relation between the level of comparative advantage and 
the  level  of  the  investment-ratio  (as  a  proxy  for  capital 
intensity).  As  follows  from  table  3  this  was  the  case  for  two 
products only (inorganic chemicals and ships).   
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with  three  in  the  group  where  scale  was  found  to  be  the  most 
important  factor  (cars,  computers  and  aircrafts  -  the  latter  in 
overlap  of  military  demand),  one  in  the  group  where  investment 
matters most (again in overlap with military demand) and one in 
the group for which no significant explanatory factor was found. 
The latter, office machinery, was one of a few products that were 
classified  as  R&D-intensive  prior  to  1973  but  not  later, 
indicating increasing maturity (and, hence, change of explanatory 
factors) during the period of investigation. 
  The findings of this study suggest that a distinction must be 
made between technology (including R&D) as an input in the process 
of production and as the most decisive factor in the process of 
global competition. Industries such as aircrafts, computers and - 
to  a  lesser  extent  -  cars  are  clearly  among  the  most  R&D 
intensive,  but  comparative  advantage  in  these  industries  is 
determined  by  access  to  a  large  domestic  market  rather  than  by 
differences between countries in R&D efforts.
13 This finding lends 
some  support  to  the  argument  by  some  new-growth  theorists  that 
large countries are more likely to develop a comparative advantage 
in high-tech. 
  However,  the  results  of  this  study  also  point  to  another 
difference between R&D as an input and technology as an important 
                     
    
13 Van Hulst et al. (1991) also found that technology variables 
had little explanatory power in some "very high-tech" industries.  
 
  18 
competitive factor. The list of products for which technology was 
found to be an important factor is broader than the list of R&D 
intensive  products  or  industries.  In  particular  it  includes  a 
larger part of the machinery and chemical sectors. This relates, 
for  instance,  to  various  types  of  general  and  specialized 
equipment  for  use  in  the  industrial  sector.  As  is  clear  from 
tables  2-4  it  is  the  inclusion  of  the  patent  variable  that 
produces  this  result.  Thus,  in  these  industries,  competition 
through  technological  innovation  is  important,  but  it  is  not 
necessarily  related  to  the  intensity  of  R&D.  This  result  is  in 
accordance  with  the  findings  of  a  number  of  innovation  studies 
showing  that  innovations  in  these  sectors  are  more  related  to 
engineering  activities,  often  in  interaction  with  customers  and 
suppliers,  than  to  organized  R&D  (Pavitt,  1984).  Since  scale 
factors  do  not  seem  to  be  important  in  these  industries,  the 
opportunities for small countries are probably better here. But, 
in  contrast  to  the  cases  where  scale-factors  were  found  to  be 
important,  most  of  these  industries  are  also  exposed  to  cost 
competition (wages).  
  How  are  these  findings  to  be  explained?  One  possibility 
suggested in the literature (Pavitt 1984, Nelson and Wright 1992) 
is that the process of technological progress differs in character 
between industries. In some industries, it is argued, innovations 
are  science-based  (result  from  organized  R&D),  written  down  
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(codified)  and  replicable.  In  other  industries  technological 
improvements  continue  to  result  from  learning  (by  doing, 
interacting etc) and are, in contrast to the science-based ones, 
often  "tacit"  (uncodified)  and  "organizational"  in  character. 
Although  these  latter  industries  also  use  legal  instruments 
(patents)  to  protect  their  innovations,  the  "tacit"  and 
"organizational"  character  of  the  innovation  process  implies  a 
high  degree  of  protection  in  itself,  i.e.  that  innovations  from 
these  industries  are  often  not  easily  replicable.  From  this  one 
might  conjecture,  using  the  language  of  the  "new-growth" 
theorists, that technological externalities are much more frequent 
in the science-based industries than in the "learning"-based ones. 
Since the hypothesis of a large-country advantage in high-tech is 
based  on  the  assumption  that  technological  externalities  are 
frequent, it is perhaps not surprising that the predictions does 
not fit all industries where innovation and, hence, technological 
competition, has been found to be important. This means, however, 
that  the  "new-growth"  theorists  have  not  succeeded  in  modelling 
technological progress in an all-encompassing way, and this puts 
some limitations on the validity of the predictions that can be 
obtained  from  this  framework.  Another  critical  point  is  that 
geographical  limitations  on  technological  externalities,  which 
plays  an  important  role  for  some  of  these  predictions,  cannot 
merely be assumed, but has to be explained (Fagerberg 1994).  
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  There is also the possibility of alternative explanations of 
the  impact  of  the  scale,  or  country-size,  variable.  The  six 
industries  for  which  scale  was  found  to  be  important  were 
aircrafts, computers, semiconductors, consumer electronics, power-
generating machinery and cars. These are all industries where non-
tariff barriers to trade are known to be important. Governmental 
favouritism  and  subsidies  have  also  been  frequent.  Thus,  a  more 
conventional  explanation  based  on  scale  economics  and  trading 
costs
14 - caused by various forms of protectionism - might perhaps 
do the trick. The present study cannot discriminate between these 
different versions of the scale argument. 
 
4. Comparison with other studies 
 
There are few other studies that can be directly compared to this 
one. Studies based on correlation between some measure of export 
performance on the one hand and R&D performance on the other, such 
as Walker (1979), tend to turn up with a more narrow definition of 
high  technology  products  than  the  one  suggested  here.  The 
methodology applied in many of these studies also differs from the 
one adopted here by using industry specific data, often based on 
the US experience, as independent variables. One study, closer to 
                     
    
14  See  the  survey  by  Helpman  (1984)  on  trade  models  with 
imperfect competition and economies of scale.  
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the framework adopted here, is that of Lacroix and Scheuer (1976). 
They  regress  exports  from  15  different  industries  on  a  set  of 
country  specific  variables  including  scale  factors,  industry-
specific  R&D  outlays,  human  capital  and  capital  intensity.  The 
level of aggregation does not allow for a detailed comparison with 
the results presented here. However, the general result was that 
R&D  turned  out  as  important  in  a  broad  range  of  industries 
including most chemical and mechanical industries. The impact of 
scale factors, however, is more difficult to assess because of the 
inclusion  of  two  variables  related  to  scale,  GDP  and  population 
(the  results  indicate  that  a  multicollinearity  problem  may  be 
present). 
  A methodology similar to that of Lacroix and Scheuer has been 
applied by Soete(1987) and Dosi and Soete(1983).
15 In Soete (1987) 
the market share for exports was regressed on a set of country-
specific  variables  reflecting  sectoral  innovative  activity 
(external  patents  in  the  United  States),  population,  capital 
intensity  and  "distance",  for  40  sectors  in  1977  (1963-1977 
average  for  the  patent  variable).  As  in  the  present  study 
technology was found to be an important factor in many sectors. 
This  includes  some  of  the  (R&D-intensive)  sectors  mentioned 
earlier, where our study points to scale, not technology, as the 
                     
    
15  See  also  Dosi,  Pavitt  and  Soete  (1990)  where  many  of  the 
empirical studies by Soete and others, including the two discussed 
here, are summarized and discussed.  
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most important competitive factor. The scale variable turned out 
as significant in a few sectors only, and with the exception of 
cars, in other sectors than the ones found here. However, as in 
the case of Laxroix and Scheuer, the way the variables are handled 
makes this result difficult to assess. Indeed, with the exception 
of the "distance" variable, all variables included in the test by 
Soete depend on the size of the country. 
  It  should  be  noted  that  there  is  an  important  difference 
between the tests conducted here and those of Lacroix and Scheuer 
and Soete in the way the technology variables are defined. In our 
study these variables are calculated for the country as a whole 
and  are  assumed  to  reflect  national  technological  capabilities. 
Lacroix and Scheuer and Soete, however, use sector specific data 
for  the  technology  variable  and  aggregated  data  for  the  others. 
The implication is that the hypothesis under test is not exactly 
the same as in our study. While we test for the impact of national 
technological  capabilities,  they  test  for  the  impact  of  sector-
specific  technological  efforts.  These  do  not  have  to  be  related 
(although they often are). For instance, a country may for some 
reason  be  specialized  in  a  particular  product  or  industry  where 
technological competition is important, and - consequently - have 
a high level of R&D and patents in that particular field, even if 
the  general  level  of  technological  activity  in  the  country  is 
rather low.   
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  Another difference between the tests by Lacroix and Scheuer 
and  Soete  and  the  tests  presented  here  is  that  neither  of  them 
included a cost variable. However, this has been done by Dosi and 
Soete (1983) on roughly the same data. But in that study the scale 
variable was omitted and the cost variable defined in a way which 
made it a mixture of costs and income distribution. Thus, it is 
not possible to make direct comparisons between the results of our 
study and those obtained in earlier studies in this respect.  
  Still, here, as in earlier studies, technology is was found 
to  be  the  single  most  important  explanatory  factor  of  export 
performance/export  specialization.  Table  5  compares  the  results 
obtained in our study with those presented by Soete (1987) with 
respect to the estimated technology elasticities. As is clear from 
the  table  the  results  are  almost  identical  for  non-electronic 
machinery.  For  electronics  the  results  are  more  difficult  to 
compare. In general, in our study these products appeared to be 
more  related  to  R&D  than  to  patents.  The  definitions  of  the 
product groups also differ somewhat. However, when care is taken 
to the fact that the mean of the estimated elasticities is higher 
for R&D than for patents, the results may be interpreted as being 
broadly  similar.  For  chemicals,  however,  our  study  generally 
reports  higher  and  more  significant  elasticities  than  those 
reported by Soete. Partly, this is due to the inclusion of R&D as 
an explanatory variable, but it does also hold for the cases for  
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which patents were found to be the most significant factor. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper has raised the question of whether or not there exists 
a  large  country  advantage  in  high-tech  industries.  The  results 
indicate that there exists a group of R&D intensive products where 
access  to  a  large  domestic  market  appears  to  be  an  important 
competitive factor, sometimes (but not always) in combination with 
a  high  share  of  military  expenditure  in  GDP.  This  includes 
aircrafts,  cars,  power  generating  machinery  and  a  large  part  of 
electronics. The results also indicate that most of these products 
are  not  very  sensitive  to  cost  competition  (wages).
16  The 
significant  impact  of  country  size  on  comparative  advantage  in 
these industries is consistent with the predictions of some new-
growth  theorists  (based  on  the  assumption  that  technology 
spillovers  are  national  rather  than  international  in  scope). 
Another possible interpretation of these results is that there is 
a  story  of  large  country  protectionism  to  be  told  here  as  much 
circumstantial  evidence  indeed  suggests.  To  the  extent  that 
                     
    
16  Indeed,  for  one  group  (cars),  the  results  indicate  that 
increasing comparative advantage and increasing wage costs vis a 
vis competitors are positively related (see table 4). This result 
is significant at the 1% level. If the level of significance is 
set  to  the  5  %  level,  similar  results  were  found  for  two  other 
groups, aluminum and power generating machinery.  
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protectionism is present, this reinforces the well-known argument 
from the trade literature that small countries has most to gain 
from reduced trade barriers (see, for instance, Krugman 1988).   
  However,  this  study  also  shows  that  technology  is  an 
important  competitive  factor  in  a  large  number  of  products  or 
industries  where  scale  factors  are  of  little  importance.  These 
include  a  large  number  of  engineering  and  chemicals  industries. 
But with some exceptions, these products are also exposed to cost 
competition  (wages).  Thus,  the  challenges  from  industrializing, 
low-cost countries may be of greater importance for small than for 
large countries (although the public attention on this is at least 
as  great  in  the  latter).  Nonetheless,  the  results  also  indicate 
that wage costs, although important, play a more passive role in 
global  competition  than  technology.
17  Thus,  small,  developed 
countries  are  not  doomed  to  specialize  in  mature,  low-tech 
industries.  The  option  for  these  countries  appears  to  be  to 
compensate for higher costs by a higher level of innovation and a 
more rapid process of diffusion. Hence, technology policy may be 
important  in  small  countries  as  well.  However,  small  countries 
                     
    
17  This  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  wage  costs,  with  two 
exceptions  (telecommunications  and  instruments  (5  %  level)), 
failed to contribute to explanation of the changes in comparative 
advantages  during  the  period  of  investigation  (see  table  4).  By 
comparison,  there  were  11  products  where  one  of  the  technology 
variables  was  shown  to  have  an  impact  on  these  changes  (5  % 
level).  
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should  avoid  imitating  the  technology  policies  of  the  large 
countries, which often concentrate resources on areas where large-
country  advantages  seem  to  be  present.  Instead,  small  countries 
ought to focus on the large number of industries where technology 
-  and  innovation  through  learning  -  is  important,  but  scale 
matters less.   
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Appendix (Data Sources - Independent variables)   
 
-  External  patent  applications:  OECD/STIIU  DATA  BANK  and  World 
International  Property  Organization(WIPO):Industrial  Property 
Statistics.  
- R&D: OECD Science and Technology Indicators 
- Military expenditure as percentage of GDP: SIPRI Yearbook 
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Table 1 List of products              SITC.Rev.1 
 
 
101 PRODUCTS BASED ON NATURAL RESOURCES 
 
1   Animals, meat and meat preparations 
2   Dairy products and eggs 
3   Fish and fish preparations 
4   Cereals and cereal preparations 
5   Feeding-stuff for animals 
6   Skins and leather manufactures 
7   Wood and wood manufactures 
8   Pulp and paper 
9   Textiles 
10  Iron ore 
11  Iron, steel and ferro alloys 
12  Aluminum 
13  Other products based on natural 
resources 
 
102 OIL AND GAS 
 




15  Organic chemicals 
16* Inorganic chemicals 
17  Dyestuffs, coloring materials 
18* Pharmaceuticals 
19  Fertilizers 
20* Plastics 
21  Other chemicals 
 
104  ENGINEERING, ELECTRONICS AND 
TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 
 
22* Power-generating machinery 
23  Machinery for special industries or 
processes 
24  Heating and cooling equipment 
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26* Typewriters and office machines 
27* Computers and peripherals 
28* Semiconductors 
29* Telecommunications 
30* Machinery for production and 
distribution of electricity 
31* Consumer electronics 
32  Domestic electrical equipment 
33* Scientific instruments, photographic 
supplies, watches and clocks 
34* Road motor vehicles 
35* Aircraft 
36  Ships and boats (incl. oil rigs) 
37  Other engineering products 
      
105 TRADITIONAL INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
 
38  Manufactures of metal 
39  Furniture 
40  Clothing 
41  Industrial products n.e.c. 
 
714.1 and 9 





724.1 and 2, 891.1 
725 
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  TABLE 2. REGRESSION RESULTS (POOLED TEST) 
 















  8  Paper  0.18  -0.58 
(1.89) 
 *** 
     1.09 
(2.85) 





  9  Textiles  0.22   0.34 
(1.92) 
 *** 
    -1.05 
(4.67) 
  * 
   










 12  Aluminium  0.24       2.17 
(2.70) 









  * 
 15  Organic Chemicals  0.34   0.66 
(2.77) 
  * 
  0.22 
 (1.69) 
  *** 
  -1.06 
(4.30) 
  * 
   0.34 
(1.79) 
 *** 
 16  Inorganic Chemicals  0.34     -0.35 
 (3.74) 
   * 
 2.25 
(3.82) 
  * 
   0.25 
(3.48) 
  * 
 1.02 
(5.04) 
  * 
 17  Colouring Materials  0.47      0.72 
 (5.49) 
   * 
  -1.17 
(4.62) 
  * 
-0.31 
(3.98) 
  * 
 
 18  Pharmaceuticals  0.47   0.43 
(1.82) 
 *** 
  0.58 
 (4.38) 
   * 
-2.65 
(5.15) 
  * 
-1.15 
(4.82) 
  * 
-0.37 
(4.74) 
  * 
 





   * 




 20  Plastics  0.39   0.72 
(4.39) 
  * 
    -0.96 
(4.78) 
  * 
   0.56 
(2.67) 
  * 
 22  Power Generating 
Machinery 
0.55      0.39 
 (5.71) 
   * 
     0.25 
(4.44) 
  * 
 
 23  Special Machinery  0.62  -0.24 
(1.78) 
 *** 
  0.71 
 (9.25) 
   * 
  -0.55 
(4.13) 
  * 
   
 24  Heating and Cooling 
Equipment 
0.25  -0.54 
(2.25) 
 ** 
  0.55 
 (4.34) 
   * 
       
 25  Pumps  0.50  -0.31 
(1.72) 
*** 
  0.67 
 (7.04) 
   * 
  -0.60 
(3.29) 
  * 
   0.29 
(2.17) 
 **  
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 26  Office Machinery  0.52      0.42 
 (3.28) 
   * 
-1.46 
(2.91) 
  * 
-0.65 
(2.80) 
  * 
 0.26 
(3.35) 
  * 
 
 27  Computers  0.33   0.48 
(2.36) 
 ** 
       0.33 
(3.76) 
  * 
 
 28  Semiconductors  0.48   1.08 
(4.81) 
  * 
    -0.92 
(3.37) 
  * 
 0.38 
(4.34) 
  * 
 
 29  Telecommunication 
Equipment 
0.34   0.78 
(4.92) 
  * 
  -0.76 
(2.66) 
  * 








0.69      0.63 
(12.5) 
   * 
  -0.96 
(8.31) 
  * 
   
 31  Consumer Electronics  0.53   0.98 
(5.55) 
  * 
       0.29 
(3.80) 
  * 
-1.51 
(8.45) 
  * 
 32  Domestic Electrical 
Equipment 
0.15  -0.50 
(2.00) 
 ** 
  0.33 
 (2.38) 
  ** 
  -0.74 
(3.01) 
  * 
   
 33  Instruments  0.64   0.85 
(4.64) 
  * 
  0.47 
 (4.95) 






  * 
  -0.49 
(2.68) 
  * 





  ** 
     0.58 
(6.75) 
  * 
 
 35  Aircrafts  0.72   0.34 
(1.78) 
 *** 
  -1.49 
(2.84) 
  * 
   0.41 
(6.87) 
  * 
 0.67 
(3.62) 
  * 
 36  Ships  0.19  -0.90 
(2.58) 
  * 
   4.95 
(4.07) 
  * 
     0.96 
(2.22) 
 ** 
 38  Metal Products  0.48      0.34 
 (5.57) 
   * 
  -0.79 
(7.47) 
  * 
   
 39  Furniture  0.15  -0.54 
(1.75) 
 *** 





  * 
 
 40  Clothing  0.49      0.20 
 (2.00) 
  ** 
-2.07 
(3.56) 
  * 
-1.56 
(6.52) 
  * 
   
*  Significant at a 1% level, two-tailed test 
 
**  Significant at a 5% level,  "     "     " 
 
***  Significant at a 10% level, "     "     "  
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TABLE 3. REGRESSION RESULTS (MEAN-TEST) 
 
    - 
R
2 
RD  PAT  INV  WAGE  POP  MIL 
8  Paper  0.09             
9  Textiles  0.12        -0.93 
(1.89) 
*** 
   
11  Steel  0.08             






15  Organic Chemicals  0.32  1.18 
(3.19) 
* 
    -0.99 
(2.02) 
** 
   












17  Colouring Materials  0.44    0.91 
(4.12) 
* 




















19  Fertilizers  0.20    -0.76 
(2.61) 
** 
      1.36 
(1.97) 
** 
20  Plastics  0.37  0.90 
(2.82) 
** 
    -1.17 
(2.61) 
** 
   
22  Power Generating 
Machinery 
0.54    0.39 
(2.68) 
** 




23  Special Machinery  0.58    0.67 
(5.13) 
* 
  -0.73 
(2.29) 
** 
   
24  Heating and Cooling 
Equipment 
0.23    0.51 
(2.71) 
** 
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28  Semiconductors  0.50  1.03 
(2.48) 
** 







29  Telecommunication 
Equipment 
0.33  0.73 
(2.48) 
** 
         




0.69    0.69 
(6.34) 
* 
  -1.17 
(4.36) 
* 
   
31  Consumer Electronics  0.52  1.04 
(2.83) 
** 






32  Domestic Electrical 
Equipment 
0.10        -0.81 
(1.75) 
*** 
   






       










36  Ships  0.22  -1.43 
(1.89) 
*** 
  8.43 
(2.74) 
** 
    1.99 
(1.97) 
*** 
38  Metal Products  0.54    0.32 
(3.69) 
* 
  -0.99 
(4.58) 
* 
   
39  Furniture  0.05             
40  Clothing  0.42        -1.94 
(3.82) 
* 
   
 
*Significant at a 1% level, two-tailed test 
 
**Significant at a 5% level,  "    "      " 
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TABLE 4. REGRESSION RESULTS (TIME DIFFERENCE TEST)
1) 
 















8  Paper  0.12    -0.49 
(1.95) 
*** 
  0.83 
(2.13) 
*** 
  -1.18 
(1.77) 
*** 
9  Textiles  0.21  0.39 
(1.95) 
*** 
     
 
 
   
11  Steel  0.04             









15  Organic Chemicals  0.57      4.22 
(5.17) 
* 
     






     
17  Colouring Materials  0.14     
 
      0.70 
(1.95) 
*** 
18  Pharmaceuticals  0.53  0.89 
(4.14) 
* 






   
19  Fertilizers  0.29  1.65 
(2.84) 
* 
         
20  Plastics  0.28   
 
  1.19 
(1.83) 
*** 
     
22  Power Generating 
Machinery 
0.48  0.78 
(2.81) 
** 






   
23  Special Machinery  0.35    0.34 
(2.67) 
** 
      0.68 
(2.08) 
*** 
24  Heating and Cooling 
Equipment 
0.71      2.56 
(3.55) 
* 
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27  Computers  0.72      3.53 
(3.10) 
* 
    3.32 
(3.38) 
* 
28  Semiconductors  0.33  0.94 
(2.21) 
** 
  1.86 
(1.94) 
*** 
     
29  Telecommunication 
Equipment 
0.68    0.63 
(4.40) 
* 



















    0.65 
(2.23) 
** 
31  Consumer Electronics  0.52  0.82 
(2.17) 
** 
  1.86 
(2.08) 
*** 
    -1.36 
(1.98) 
*** 
32  Domestic Electrical 
Equipment 
0.12             
33  Instruments  0.53    0.31 
(3.25) 
* 
  -0.47 
(2.97) 
* 
  0.92 
(3.67) 
* 
34  Cars  0.50  0.75 
(2.77) 
** 
    0.80 
(2.95) 
* 
   
35  Aircrafts  0.07             
 
36  Ships  0.06             
38  Metal Products  0.02             
39  Furniture  0.03             






      -1.02 
(2.15) 
** 
*Significant at a 1% level, two-tailed test 
 
**Significant at a 5% level,  "    "      " 
 
***Significant at a 10% level, "    "      " 
 
1)   Final period observation 
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TABLE 5.  RANKING ACCORDING TO TECHNOLOGY-ELASTICITY 
 
 
PATENTS MATTER:     OUR (mean-test)  SOETE (1987)
1 
 
1. Colouring Materials (17)      0.91       0.33/NS 
2. Pharmaceuticals (18)      0.78       0.34 
3. Machinery for Production and 
   Distribution of Electricity (30)    0.69       0.67/0.62 
4. Special machinery (23)      0.67       0.68/0.66/0.57 
5. Pumps (25)          0.64      (0.49) 
6. Heating and Cooling Equipment (24)  0.51       0.51 
7. Power Generating Machinery (22)    0.39       0.47 





1. Organic Chemicals (15)      1.18       NS 
2. Consumer Electronics (31)      1.04       NS 
3. Semiconductors (28)      1.03      (0.46) 
4. Plastics (20)         0.90       0.31 
5. Telecommunications (29)      0.73      (0.46) 
 
 
BOTH PATENTS AND R&D MATTER: 
 
Instruments (33) (Patents)      0.44       0.74 






1.This column contains estimates as reported by Soete for comparable (not identical)  
product groups. All estimates refer to patents. 
Brackets: His classification is more aggregated than ours. 
Several numbers: His classification is more dis-aggregated than ours. 




  39 
 
 